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Abstract
This study provides a growth-theoretic analysis on the e¤ects of intellectual prop-
erty rights on the endogenous takeo¤ of an economy. We incorporate patent protection
into a Schumpeterian growth model in which takeo¤ occurs when the population size
crosses an endogenous threshold. We nd that strengthening patent protection has
contrasting e¤ects on economic growth at di¤erent stages of the economy. Specically,
it leads to an earlier takeo¤ (i.e., an earlier industrial revolution) but also reduces
economic growth in the long run.
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"England [...] by 1700 [...] had developed an e¢ cient set of property rights
embedded in the common law [and...] begun to protect private property in knowl-
edge with its patent law. The stage was now set for the industrial revolution."
North and Thomas (1973, p. 156)
1 Introduction
Figure 1 plots the real GDP per capita in the UK.1 It shows that in the 18th century, income
in the UK grew very slowly. Specically, the average annual growth rate of income in the
UK from 1701 to 1800 was 0.4%. Then, the average growth rate from 1801 to 1900 increased
to 1.0%. From the 20th century onwards, the average growth rate stabilized at about 1.7%.
Figure 1: Real GDP per capita in the UK from 1700 to 2016
This study explores the e¤ects of intellectual property rights (IPR) on the endogenous
takeo¤ of an economy. We incorporate patent protection into the Schumpeterian growth
model of endogenous takeo¤ in Peretto (2015). In this model, the economy rst experiences
stagnation with zero growth in output per capita when the market size (determined by the
population size) is small. As the market size becomes su¢ ciently large due to population
growth, innovation takes place and the economy gradually experiences growth. In the long
run, the economy converges to a balanced growth path (BGP) with steady-state growth.
Within this growth-theoretic framework that is consistent with the growth pattern in Figure
1, we obtain the following results.
Strengthening patent protection leads to an earlier takeo¤. Incentives for innovation to
take place depend on the market value of inventions, which in turn depends on the level of
patent protection and the market size. Therefore, when stronger patent protection increases
the market value of patents, it also reduces the market size required for innovation to take
1Data source: Maddison Project Database.
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place. As a result, the economy starts to experience innovation and growth at an earlier time
(i.e., an earlier industrial revolution). Our nding that stronger IPR protection leads to an
earlier (but not necessarily immediate) takeo¤ is consistent with historical evidence on the
e¤ects of IPR on the industrial revolution.2 However, stronger patent protection eventually
reduces innovation and growth as recent studies tend to nd.3 Intuitively, although stronger
patent protection increases the number of products in the economy, this larger number of
products reduces the market size of each product and the incentives for quality-improving
innovation, which determine long-run growth.4
This study relates to the literature on innovation and economic growth. Romer (1990)
develops the seminal variety-expanding growth model in which innovation is driven by new
products, whereas Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop the Schumpeterian quality-ladder
growth model in which innovation is driven by higher-quality products. Peretto (1998,
1999) and Smulders and van de Klundert (1995) combine the two dimensions of innovation
and develop a Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous market structure. This study
explores the e¤ects of IPR in this vintage of the Schumpeterian growth model.
In the literature on IPR and innovation, other studies also explore the e¤ects of IPR in
the innovation-driven growth model.5 These studies mostly focus on either variety expansion
or quality improvement. Only a few studies, such as Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2012) and Chu,
Furukawa and Ji (2016), explore the e¤ects of IPR in the Schumpeterian growth model with
both dimensions of innovation. However, none of these studies consider how IPR a¤ects the
endogenous takeo¤ of an economy. The novel contributions of this study are to explore the
e¤ects of IPR in a Schumpeterian growth model of endogenous takeo¤ and to highlight the
contrasting e¤ects of IPR on economic growth at di¤erent stages of the economy.
This study also relates to the literature on endogenous takeo¤ and economic growth.
Early studies include Galor and Weil (2000), Jones (2001) and Hansen and Prescott (2002).
Peretto (2015) develops a Schumpeterian growth model of endogenous takeo¤. The Peretto
model features both quality improvement and variety expansion, under which endogenous
growth in the number of products provides a dilution e¤ect that removes the scale e¤ect
of population size on long-run growth. Therefore, although the population size a¤ects the
timing of the takeo¤, it does not a¤ect the steady-state growth rate. We incorporate patent
protection into the Peretto model to explore its e¤ects on endogenous takeo¤.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
explores the e¤ects of patent policy at di¤erent stages of the economy. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
The theoretical framework is based on the Schumpeterian growth model with both variety-
expanding innovation and quality-improving innovation in Peretto (2015). In this model,
2See e.g., North and Thomas (1973), North (1981), Dutton (1984) and Khan (2005).
3See Ja¤e and Lerner (2004), Bessen and Meurer (2008) and Boldrin and Levine (2008) for evidence.
4See Peretto and Connolly (2007) for a theoretical explanation on quality-improving innovation being the
only plausible engine of long-run growth.
5See e.g., Li (2001), Goh and Olivier (2002), ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004), Furukawa (2007), Chu
(2009), Iwaisako and Futagami (2013), Cozzi and Galli (2014), Huang et al. (2017) and Yang (2018).
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labor is used as a factor input for the production of nal good. Final good is used for
consumption and as a factor input for entry, in-house R&D, the production and operation of
intermediate goods. We incorporate a patent policy parameter into the model and analyze
its e¤ects on the takeo¤, transitional dynamics and the BGP of the economy.
2.1 Household
The representative household has a utility function given by
U =
Z 1
0
e ( ) ln ctdt, (1)
where ct  Ct=Lt denotes per capita consumption of nal good (numeraire) at time t, and
 > 0 is the subjective discount rate. Population grows at an exogenous rate  2 (0; ) with
initial population normalized to unity (i.e., Lt = et). The household maximizes (1) subject
to
_at = (rt   ) at + wt   ct, (2)
where at  At=Lt is the real value of assets owned by each member of the household, and
rt is the real interest rate. Each member supplies one unit of labor to earn wt. Standard
dynamic optimization yields
_ct
ct
= rt   . (3)
2.2 Final good
Final output Yt is produced by competitive rms using the following production function:
Yt =
Z Nt
0
Xt (i)

Zt (i)Z
1 
t Lt=N
1 
t
1 
di, (4)
where f; ; g 2 (0; 1). Xt (i) is the quantity of non-durable intermediate goods i 2 [0; Nt].
The productivity of Xt (i) depends on its quality Zt (i) and the average quality of all inter-
mediate goods Zt 
R Nt
0
Zt (j) dj=Nt capturing technology spillovers. The private return to
quality is determined by , and the degree of technology spillovers is determined by 1  .
The parameter 1   captures a congestion e¤ect of variety, and hence, the social return to
variety is measured by .
Prot maximization yields the following conditional demand functions for Lt and Xt (i):
Lt = (1  )Yt=wt, (5)
Xt (i) =


pt (i)
1=(1 )
Zt (i)Z
1 
t Lt=N
1 
t , (6)
where pt (i) is the price ofXt (i). Perfect competition implies that rms pay Yt =
R Nt
0
pt (i)Xt (i) di
for intermediate goods.
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2.3 Intermediate goods and in-house R&D
Monopolistic rms produce di¤erentiated intermediate goods with a linear technology that
requires Xt (i) units of nal good to produce Xt (i) units of intermediate good i 2 [0; Nt].
The rm in industry i incurs Zt (i)Z
1 
t units of nal good as a xed operating cost. To
improve the quality of its products, the rm devotes It (i) units of nal good to in-house
R&D. The innovation process is
_Zt (i) = It (i) , (7)
and the rms (before-R&D) prot ow at time t is
t (i) = [pt (i)  1]Xt (i)  Zt (i)Z1 t . (8)
The value of the monopolistic rm in industry i is
Vt (i) =
Z 1
t
exp

 
Z s
t
rudu

[s (i)  Is (i)] ds. (9)
The monopolistic rm maximizes (9) subject to (7) and (8). We solve this dynamic opti-
mization problem in the proof of Lemma 1 and nd that the unconstrained prot-maximizing
markup ratio is 1=. To analyze the e¤ects of patent breadth, we introduce a policy para-
meter  > 1, which determines the unit cost for imitative rms to produce Xt (i). A larger
patent breadth  allows the monopolistic producer of Xt (i), who owns the patent, to charge
a higher markup without losing her market share to potential imitators;6 see also Li (2001),
Goh and Olivier (2002) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013). The equilibrium price becomes
pt (i) = min f; 1=g . (10)
We assume that  < 1=. In this case, increasing patent breadth raises the markup.
We follow previous studies to consider a symmetric equilibrium in which Zt (i) = Zt
for i 2 [0; Nt] and the size of each intermediate-good rm is identical across all industries
Xt (i) = Xt.7 From (6) and pt (i) = , the quality-adjusted rm size is
Xt
Zt
=



1=(1 )
Lt
N1 t
. (11)
We dene the following transformed variable:
xt  1=(1 )Xt
Zt
= 1=(1 )
Lt
N1 t
, (12)
which is a state variable and not directly a¤ected by  (but indirectly via Nt). In Lemma 1,
we derive the rate of return on quality-improving R&D, which is increasing in xt and .
6This setup is consistent with Gilbert and Shapiros (1990) insight on patent breadth as the ability of
the patentee to raise priceand originates from the patent-design literature; e.g., Gallini (1992) also assumes
that a larger patent breadth increases the imitation cost of imitators.
7Symmetry also implies t (i) = t, It (i) = It and Vt (i) = Vt.
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Lemma 1 The rate of return on quality-improving in-house R&D is8
rqt = 
t
Zt
= 

  1
1=(1 )
xt   

. (13)
Proof. See the Appendix.
2.4 Entrants
Following previous studies, we assume that entrants have access to aggregate technology Zt
to ensure symmetric equilibrium at any time t. A new rm pays Xt units of nal good to
enter the market with a new variety of intermediate goods and set up its operation.  > 0
is an entry-cost parameter. The asset-pricing equation implies that the return on assets is
rt =
t   It
Vt
+
_Vt
Vt
. (14)
When entry is positive, free entry implies
Vt = Xt. (15)
Substituting (7), (8), (12), (15) and pt =  into (14) yields the return on entry as
ret =
1=(1 )


  1
1=(1 )
  + zt
xt

+
_xt
xt
+ zt, (16)
where zt  _Zt=Zt is the growth rate of aggregate quality.
2.5 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fAt; Yt; Ct; Xt; Itg and prices frt; wt; pt; Vtg such
that
 the household maximizes utility taking frt; wtg as given;
 competitive rms produce Yt and maximize prots taking fwt; ptg as given;
 incumbents for intermediate goods choose fpt; Itg to maximize Vt taking rt as given;
 entrants make entry decisions taking Vt as given;
 the value of all existing monopolistic rms adds up to the value of the households
assets such that At = NtVt; and
 the following market-clearing condition of nal good holds:
Yt = Ct +Nt (Xt + Zt + It) + _NtXt. (17)
8Note that (  1)=1=(1 ) is increasing in  for  < 1=.
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2.6 Aggregation
Substituting (6) and pt =  into (4) and imposing symmetry yield aggregate output as
Yt = (=)
=(1 )Nt ZtLt. (18)
The growth rate of output per capita is
gt  _yt
yt
= nt + zt, (19)
where yt  Yt=Lt denotes output per capita. Its growth rate gt is determined by both the
variety growth rate nt  _Nt=Nt and the quality growth rate zt.
3 Dynamics of the economy
The dynamics of the economy is determined by the dynamics of xt = 
1=(1 )Lt=N1 t . Its
initial value is x0 = 
1=(1 )=N1 0 . In the rst stage of the economy, there is neither variety
expansion nor quality improvement. At this stage, xt increases solely due to population
growth. When xt becomes su¢ ciently large, innovation begins to happen. The following
inequality ensures the realistic case in which the creation of products (i.e., variety-expanding
innovation) happens before the improvement of products (i.e., quality-improving innovation).
 <
  1  (  ) 
(  ) 

  + (=) (  1  (  ) )
1  (=) (  (  ) )

. (20)
Variety-expanding innovation happens when xt crosses the rst threshold xN dened as
xN  
1=(1 )
  1  (  )  . (21)
Then, quality-improving innovation also happens when xt crosses the second threshold xZ
dened as
xZ  arg
x
solve

  1
1=(1 )
x  
 
  
1=(1 )
x

=    (  )

. (22)
The inequality in (20) implies xN < xZ . In the long run, xt converges to its steady-state value
x. The following inequalities ensure that when the economy is on the BGP, the variables
fx; z; gg are positive:
 >
1


  1  

+

1  

>   1. (23)
The following proposition adapted from Peretto (2015) summarizes the dynamics of xt.
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Proposition 1 When the initial condition of the economy satises9
1=(1 )= (  1) < x0 < xN , (24)
the dynamics of xt is given by10
_xt =
8<:
xt > 0 x0  xt  xN
v (x   xt) > 0 xN < xt  xZ
v (x   xt)  0 xt > xZ
, (25)
where
v  1  


  1  

+

1  

,
x  
1=(1 )
  1   [+ = (1  )] ,
v  1  


(1  ) (  1)  

+

1  

,
x  1=(1 ) (1  )  [+ = (1  )]
(1  ) (  1)   [+ = (1  )] .
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.1 Stage 1: Stagnation
When the market size is not large enough (i.e., xt  xN), there are insu¢ cient incentives
for rms to develop new products nor improve the quality of existing products. In this case,
output per capita is
yt = (=)
=(1 )N0 Z0, (26)
and the growth rate of yt is gt = 0. In this regime, strengthening patent protection  de-
creases yt due to monopolistic distortion that reduces intermediate production Xt. However,
stronger patent protection also leads to an earlier (but not necessarily immediate) takeo¤
by decreasing xN in (21). Intuitively, stronger patent protection increases the protability
of rms and provides more incentives for rms to develop new products. As a result, the
economy starts to experience innovation at an earlier time.
Proposition 2 When xt  xN , stronger patent protection reduces the level of output per
capita but leads to an earlier takeo¤.
Proof. Use (21) and (26) to show that xN and yt are decreasing in . Given that xt increases
at the exogenous rate  when xt  xN , a smaller xN implies an earlier takeo¤.
9The inequality x0 > 1=(1 )= (  1) implies that 0 > 0.
10Note that (23) ensures xZ < x.
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3.2 Stage 2: Variety expansion
When the market size is su¢ ciently large (i.e., xt > xN), rms have incentives to develop
new products. In this case, output per capita is
yt = (=)
=(1 )Nt Z0, (27)
and the growth rate of yt is gt = nt. In the Appendix, we show that whenever nt > 0,
ct=yt always jumps to a steady state. Therefore, we can substitute ret in (16) into the Euler
equation rt = + gt = + nt in (3) and also use (12) to derive the variety growth rate as11
nt =
1=(1 )


  1
1=(1 )
  
xt

  + . (28)
For a given level of xt, the equilibrium growth rate gt = nt is increasing in patent breadth
 as in previous studies, such as Li (2001) and ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004).
Proposition 3 For a given xt 2 (xN ; xZ), stronger patent protection increases the equilib-
rium growth rate.
Proof. Use (28) to show that gt = nt is increasing in  for a given xt.
3.3 Stage 3: Quality improvement and variety expansion
When the market size becomes even larger (i.e., xt > xZ), rms have incentives to improve
the quality of products in addition to inventing new products. Then, output per capita is
yt = (=)
=(1 )Nt Zt, (29)
and the growth rate of yt is gt = nt + zt. We can then substitute r
q
t in (13) into the Euler
equation rt = + gt = + nt + zt in (3) to derive the quality growth rate as12
zt = 

  1
1=(1 )
xt   

    nt. (30)
For a given level of xt, the equilibrium growth rate gt = nt + zt continues to be increasing
in patent breadth  that raises the return to quality-improving innovation.
Proposition 4 For a given xt 2 (xZ ; x), stronger patent protection increases the equilib-
rium growth rate.
Proof. Use (30) to show that gt = nt + zt is increasing in  for a given xt.
11Note from (21) and (28) that nt > 0 if and only if xt > xN .
12It can be shown that zt > 0 if and only if xt > xZ .
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3.4 Stage 4: Balanced growth path
In the long run, xt converges to x. Then, the steady-state quality growth rate is
z = 

  1
1=(1 )
x   

    n, (31)
where n = =(1  ) > 0 and
x = 1=(1 )
(1  )  [+ = (1  )]
(1  ) (  1)   [+ = (1  )] , (32)
which is decreasing in . Intuitively, stronger patent protection increases the number of
products, which leads to a smaller market size for each product. This smaller rm size x in
turn reduces the incentives for quality-improving innovation and the steady-state equilibrium
growth rate g = n+ z. This result generalizes the one in Chu et al. (2016), who assume
zero social return to variety (i.e.,  = 0).
Proposition 5 On the BGP (i.e., xt = x), stronger patent protection decreases the steady-
state equilibrium growth rate.
Proof. Use (31) and (32) to show that g = n + z is decreasing in .
Finally, we conclude this section with Figure 2.13 It summarizes the entire transition
path of the equilibrium growth rate gt and shows that strengthening patent protection leads
to an earlier takeo¤ but lower long-run growth.
Figure 2: Transition path of the growth rate
13TN (TZ) is the time when variety-expanding (quality-improving) innovation is activated.
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4 Conclusion
In this study, we analyze the e¤ects of IPR in a Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous
takeo¤ and nd that strengthening patent protection causes an earlier takeo¤ by increasing
the protability of rms and providing more incentives for rms to innovate. However,
stronger patent protection eventually slows down economic growth by reducing the market
size of each product and the incentives for quality-improving innovation. These contrasting
e¤ects of IPR at di¤erent stages of the economy are consistent with historical evidence on
the industrial revolution and recent evidence on the e¤ects of the patent system.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The current-value Hamiltonian for monopolistic rm i is
Ht (i) = t (i)  It (i) + t (i) _Zt (i) + !t (i) [  pt (i)] , (A1)
where !t (i) is the multiplier on pt (i)  . Substituting (6)-(8) into (A1), we can derive
@Ht (i)
@pt (i)
= 0) @t (i)
@pt (i)
= !t (i) , (A2)
@Ht (i)
@It (i)
= 0) t (i) = 1, (A3)
Ht (i)
@Zt (i)
= 
(
[pt (i)  1]


pt (i)
1=(1 )
Lt
N1 t
  
)
Z 1t (i)Z
1 
t = rtt (i)  _t (i) . (A4)
If pt (i) < , then !t (i) = 0. In this case, @t (i) =@pt (i) = 0 yields pt (i) = 1=. If the
constraint on pt (i) is binding, then !t (i) > 0. In this case, we have pt (i) = . Therefore,
pt (i) = min f; 1=g . (A5)
Given that we assume  < 1= , the monopolistic rm sets its price at pt (i) = . Substituting
(A3), (12) and pt (i) =  into (A4) and imposing symmetry yield
rqt = 
t
Zt
= 

  1
1=(1 )
xt   

, (A6)
which is the rate of return on quality-improving in-house R&D.
Before we prove Proposition 1, we rst derive the dynamics of the consumption-output
ratio Ct=Yt when nt > 0.
Lemma 2 When nt > 0, the consumption-output ratio always jumps to
Ct=Yt =  (=) (  ) + 1  . (A7)
Proof. The total value of assets owned by the household is
At = NtVt. (A8)
When nt > 0, the no-arbitrage condition for entry in (15) holds. Then, substituting (15)
and XtNt = Yt into (A8) yields
At = NtXt = (=) Yt, (A9)
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which implies that the asset-output ratio At=Yt is constant. Substituting (A9), (2), (3) and
(5) into _At=At = _at=at +  yields
_Yt
Yt
=
_At
At
= rt +
wtLt
At
  Ct
At
= +
_Ct
Ct
  + (1  )

  

Ct
Yt
, (A10)
which can be rearranged as
_Ct
Ct
 
_Yt
Yt
=


Ct
Yt
  (1  )

  (  ) . (A11)
Therefore, the dynamics of Ct=Yt is characterized by saddle-point stability, such that Ct=Yt
jumps to its steady-state value in (A7).
Proof of Proposition 1. Using (12), we can derive the growth rate of xt as
_xt
xt
=   (1  )nt. (A12)
When x0  xt  xN , we have nt = 0 and zt = 0. In this case, the dynamics of xt is given by
_xt = xt. (A13)
When xN < xt  xZ , we have nt > 0 and zt = 0. In this case, Lemma 2 implies that
Ct=Yt is constant and _ct=ct = _yt=yt. Therefore, we can substitute ret in (16) and (A12) into
rt = + nt in (3) to obtain (28). Substituting (28) into (A12) yields the dynamics of xt as
_xt =
1  


1=(1 )  

  1  

+

1  

xt

. (A14)
Dening v  1 


  1    + 
1 

and x  1=(1 )
 1 (+ 1 )
, we can express (A14) as
_xt = v(x
   xt). (A15)
When xt > xZ , we have nt > 0 and zt > 0. In this case, Ct=Yt is also constant, and
_ct=ct = _yt=yt. Then, substituting ret in (16) and (A12) into rt = + nt + zt in (3) yields
nt =
1=(1 )


  1
1=(1 )
  + zt
xt

  + . (A16)
We substitute (30) into (A16) to derive
nt =
[(1  ) (  1)  (  ) ] xt=1=(1 )  (1  )+ 
(xt) =1=(1 )    . (A17)
Substituting (A17) into (A12) yields the dynamics of xt as
_xt =
1  
   1=(1 )=xt

(1  ) 

+

1  

1=(1 )  

(1  ) (  1)  

+

1  

xt

.
(A18)
Using v  1 
 1=(1 )=xt

(1  ) (  1)    + 
1 

and x in (32), we express (A18) as
_xt = v (x
   xt) , (A19)
where we approximate 1=(1 )=xt = 0 for xt > xz, so v = 1 

(1  ) (  1)    + 
1 

becomes a constant.
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